This paper explores the impacts of key policy actions by US and European authorities on stock returns of systemically important banks in Europe and US around the subprime crisis. We …nd that the US policy announcements had a stronger impact on the European and US banking industry than the European policy announcements. In particular, the announcements of monetary policies and …nancial sector policies by the US authorities were accompanied by higher abnormal returns compared to related announcements of European authorities while the announcements of the US liability guarantees had the most favorable impact on the banking stock returns during the crisis. The lead role of US policies compared to European policies was strengthened after the collapse of Lehman brothers. We also …nd that the policy announcements, regardless of which side of the Atlantic the news arrived from, has increased the return volatility during the crisis. Our results lend additional support to the literature documenting event-induced volatility increases.
In this paper we analyze how the respective stock markets, banking stocks in particular, perceived those policy actions from the two sides of the Atlantic. To that end we use the policy news database constructed by Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak and Tamirisa (2012) to investigate the immediate reactions of systemically important banking stock across Europe and US. In particular we analyze the abnormal returns and the induced volatilities corresponding to the several types of key policy announcements by US and European authorities during the crisis as identi…ed by Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) . The …nancial crisis has impaired the whole stock market but has especially destabilized the banking sector. The market reactions to the various policy announcements are of great interest to the scholars and the policy makers seeking the best ways to reverse the negative market sentiment and to halt the economic contagion.
The dynamics of the stock prices during the crisis period indicate strong heteroskedastic volatility and cross-sectionally diverged volatility which would impair the power of the traditional tests of signi…cance of the abnormal returns. Our empirical strategy is based on the exponential general autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (EGARCH) model with announcement dummies which is a variant of the approach suggested by Savickas (2003) . This approach is a natural one given our focus on how policy announcements a¤ect stock returns and volatility under serially heteroskedastic volatility.
Furthermore, the crisis period is dotted with a large number of potentially important announcements from the US and European authorities which refer to di¤erent policy types or policy mixes.
They exhibit a large degree of clustering overtime which implies that using event windows of a few days around each announcement, as is typically done in event studies, would result in overlapping events rendering the interpretation of the results quite di¢ cult. To reduce the number of overlapping events we thus focus only on the immediate stock response on the announcement day, i.e., we use a one-day event window. Hence this study is an investigation of immediate market responses to policy announcements and does not aim to provide an analysis on the long-term e¤ectiveness of policies.
Several studies examine the role of policy actions during the recent subprime mortgage crisis.
See for example McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008) , Baba and Packer (2009), Panetta, Faeh, Grande, Ho, King, Levy, Signoretti, Taboga and Zaghini (2009) and Taylor and Williams (2009) 
The two papers most closely related to our own are King (2009) and Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak and Tamirisa (2012) . King (2009) studies the market reaction around the subprime crisis particularly to bank rescue packages announced in six countries and shows that bank stock prices continued to underperform in all countries except US. The traditional event study methodology with 100 day event windows used by the author does not consider serial heteroskedasticity, event induced volatility and overlapping events. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) construct a detailed database of macroeconomic and …nancial sector policy initiatives, also employed in this paper, and investigate the impact of policy announcements in the US, UK, the euro area, and Japan during the subprime mortgage crisis. Their focus though is di¤erent. To examine the impact on interbank credit and liquidity risk premia they analyze the immediate response on the Libor-OIS spread. Like King (2009), they do not address the problem of serial heteroskedasticity and event induced volatility.
Our …ndings suggest that overall US policy announcements had a stronger impact on the banking industry than European policy announcements. In particular, the announcements of monetary policies and …nancial sector policies by the US authorities were accompanied by higher abnormal returns compared to related announcements of the European authorities while the announcements of the US liability guarantees had the most favorable impact on the banking stock returns during the crisis. The …ndings are in line with the literature documenting that the US news a¤ect the behavior of asset prices around the world but that the opposite is not true (Andersen et al. 2003 , Becker et al. 1995 , Ehramann and Fratzscher 2003 , Wongswan, 2006 . We also …nd that the policy announcements, regardless of which side of the Atlantic the news arrived from, have increased the return volatility during the crisis. Our results lend additional support to the literature documenting event-induced volatility increases (Savickas 2003, Harrington and Shrider 2007) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the policy announcements and data.
Section 3 explains our econometric approach for estimating the impact of policy actions. Section 4 reports our empirical results while Section 5 concludes with a summary of our …ndings.
Policy Announcements and Stock Data

Policy Announcements
The policy event database we apply is constructed by Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) Bank (ECB) and country authorities from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. The policy announcements included are those which are considered as watershed policy events. To identify major policy events the authors search front-page articles where the policy announcement is the main subject. Announcements appearing as front-page news one day before and up to three days after the date of the o¢ cial announcement are quali…ed as watershed events.
The policy announcements are next classi…ed in six groups: …scal policies; monetary policies; liquidity supports; …nancial sector policies; policy inaction and bailouts/failures; other measures.
Each group, except …scal policies and other measures, is further subdivided so that the policies are ultimately divided into twelve categories. The number of policy event days for each category is reported in Table 1. [Insert Table 1] Fiscal policies are economic stimulus measures such as public spending, tax reductions and job creation associated with an expansion in government expenditures.
Monetary policies are categorized in two groups, interest rate cuts and quantitative and credit easing. The latter group includes central bank's purchase of longer-term government bonds (quan-titative easing) or private assets such as commercial papers and mortgage backed securities (credit easing).
Two types of liquidity support policies are included, domestic currency liquidity support and foreign currency swaps. The former group consists of central bank's actions providing liquidity of domestic currency through measures such as discount rate cuts, extending maturity, creating auction facilities and expansion of the auctions, for instance. The latter group mostly consists of the US dollar liquidity-providing operations which are coordinated actions by the ECB and the FED.
Financial sector policies are classi…ed into three types, asset purchases, liability guarantees and recapitalizations. The …rst group includes programs purchasing bad loans and risky assets such as mortgage backed securities from troubled …nancial institutions. The second group consists of policies such as establishing schemes which protect consumer deposits and guarantee debt obligations of …nancial institutions. The last group includes capital injections to the banks directly or indirectly through recapitalization programs.
Policy inaction and bailouts/failures are divided into three subgroups, interest rate increases/unchanged, bailouts and assisted mergers, and failures. The second and third groups include decisions to rescue (or not to rescue) particular …nancial institutions rather than establishing a comprehensive rescue program.
Other measures consists of other major policy announcements not included in the above groups. The high frequency of the various policy announcements and their overlapping nature is evident from the …gure. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) cautions about the overlapping events in the data base which would cause an identi…cation problem contaminating the analysis. In order to reduce the number of overlapping announcements several e¤orts were undertaken by them. 1 In this paper we employ the main event class of policy announcements (announcements featured as a main event on the frontpage) in the database. Moreover, a one-day event window is used to further reduce the number of overlapping events. 2
Data
The European and US banks included in our study are listed in Annex 1 and 2 respectively. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the log daily returns of three equally weighted portfolios All banks, European banks only, and US banks only.
[Insert Table 2] 2 We have considered to use wider event windows to capture the anticipation and possible lagged e¤ects. However the number of overlapping announcements triples from 41 to 138 if we extend to a three-day event window (1 day before and 1 day after the announcement) .
3 Our sample covers all the globally systemically important …nancial institutions de…ned by the Basel committee on banking supervision in November 2011 except for Banque Populaire (a French institution not publicly traded) . 4 Bankscope data are used to create the ranking. 5 Although they survived the selection criteria we also eliminate from the US sample the government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Sallie Mae due to their particular quasi-public nature. and the enlarged standard deviation of returns (188 bps in the pre-and 544 bps in the post-Lehman periods) demonstrates the volatile state of the …nancial markets. The standard deviation has surged more than ten-fold for the US banks from the tranquil to the post-Lehman period. Such strongly time-varying volatility would impair the results from a traditional event study approach. In order to overcome this problem we apply a GARCH-based approach suggested in the literature (Corhay and Tourani-Rad 1996 , Brockett et al 1999 , Savickas 2003 , Balaban and Constantinou 2006 .
The table also reports the return correlation between the European portfolio and the US portfolio. As it has been observed in preceding crashes the correlation has increased during the crisis period (King and Wadhwani 1990 , Lee and Kim 1993 , Calvo and Reinhart 1996 , Baig and Goldfajn 1999 , Forbes and Rigobon 2002 .
The data also show a sharp increase in cross-sectional variation of individual stock return volatility during the crisis period consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012) . The cross-sectional standard deviation of the mean returns has increased from 4 bps in the tranquil period to 10 bps in the pre-Lehman and then to 33 bps in the post-Lehman periods. In order to highlight this variation we compute the 100 days rolling window volatility of daily returns for each stock. Then for each sub-sample, European banks and US banks, and for each day, the cross-sectional standard deviations of the rolling window volatility are computed. Figure 2 plots the time series of the cross-sectional standard deviations of the rolling window volatility.
[Insert Figure 2] The …gure clearly demonstrates the strong surge of the cross-sectional variation of return volatility during the pre-Lehman period which reached a peak during the post-Lehman period. Given the strong cross-sectional variation in return volatility during the crisis period the volatility e¤ect of policy announcement is likely not to be the same across stocks, which could produce eventinduced variance increases (Harrington and Shrider 2007) . The approach we employ to overcome this problem is outlined in the next section.
Methodology
The event study method has been commonly used to analyze market responses to the policy announcements in crisis periods (see for example, Aït-Sahalia et al., 2011 , Kho et al.,2000 , Miyajima and Yafeh, 2007 and Ongena et al., 2003 . However, the presence of heteroskedastic volatility of stock returns observed in the previous section would impair the power of the traditional tests. In order to tackle this problem we implement a variation of the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, GARCH (Bollerslev, 1986 ) -based approach suggested by Savickas (2003) . More speci…cally, we employ the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) model to allow for asymmetric e¤ects between positive and negative returns (Nelson, 1991) .
As in the traditional event study methodology we relate the daily log return of stock i, r it ; to the daily log return of the market portfolio, r mt ; via the market model. Then our EGARCH-based approach estimates the following model:
ln 2 i;t
for k = E; U S where policies announced by European (US) authorities are labeled as E (U S). fe it g is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables following the standard normal distribution.
D t is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the crisis period and 0 for the tranquil period.
This allows the "market beta" to be dependent on the state of the economy and …nancial markets (McQueen and Roley 1993, Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur 1995) . In this study the crisis period With each daily return series of banking stocks i, model (1) is estimated for each policy type j for k = E; U S. Then we cross-sectionally test whether the banking industry speci…c reaction to the type j policies is statistically di¤erent from zero. Hence the null hypothesis to be tested is 
where
for k = E; U S: L is the number of type j policy announcements, b k r;i;j is the estimate of k r;i;j , and b i;l is the estimated conditional standard deviation of abnormal return on event day l. Similarly, the statistical signi…cance of event induced volatility is tested with a variant of the test statistic introduced by Balaban and Constantinou (2006) :
for k = E; U S: b h i is the standard deviation of the estimated conditional standard deviation series for bank i. The test statistics are Student-t distributed with N 1 degrees of freedom.
Empirical Results
We …rst use the overall crisis period (06. 
European policy vs US policy: Overall crisis period
We start our analysis with the policy announcements during the crisis period (06.01.2007 -03.31.2009) for all banks. In Table 3 , we report the cross-sectional average of the estimated abnormal returns, k r;i;j ; and that of induced volatility, k v;i;j ; from the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (1) for each policy group.
[Insert Table 3] For ease of interpretation, while we use S k r;i;j of equation (3) to construct the signi…cance test, the numbers reported in Table 3 are based on the cross sectional mean of policy e¤ect estimates.
In the …rst and the second column we calculate the average of the estimated abnormal returns observed on the European and the US policy announcement days, respectively. In the third column we subtract the two …gures (European policy -US policy). A r then represents the di¤erent reactions between the European and the US policy announcements.
Overall it appears that US policy announcements had a stronger impact on the banking industry than European policy announcements. US policy announcements were signi…cantly stronger than European ones for four policy types compared to only one policy type where the inverse holds true. In particular, the announcements of monetary policies and …nancial sector policies by the US authorities were accompanied by higher abnormal returns. The exceptional case is the announcements by the European authorities concerning asset purchases which outperformed that of the US authorities by 1.76% on average. It seems that the announcements of the US liability guarantees had the most favorable impact on the banking stock returns during the crisis. Turning our attention now to the standalone reactions to the individual policy types the following observations can be made.
Fiscal Policy Several stimulus plans, three by the European and six by the US government, were announced during the crisis. The banking stocks did not react signi…cantly to these …scal policy measures. This is probably because the direct e¤ects on the banking industry were not clear due to the contents of the stimulus packages such as job creation, tax cut and infrastructure spending.
Monetary Policy Reductions of the target for the US federal funds rate are accompanied by signi…cant abnormal returns. They exceed 20 basis points on the day of the announcement (the following day for the European banks). On the other hand, the announcements of a decrease in the re…nancing rate by the European Central Bank (ECB) or/and a reduction of the o¢ cial bank rate by the Bank of England (BoE) were not associated with a signi…cant abnormal return. Financial Sector Policies The reported signi…cant average abnormal return of -1.32% on the announcement days of US asset purchase programs could be due to the political disagreement and/or uncertainty of how the bill would be implemented and/or a discouraging monthly jobs report released on the same date. The asset purchase programs announced by the European authorities were accompanied by positive abnormal returns on average. 9 The signi…cantly positive A r implies that the news on European asset purchase programs were absorbed by the market more favorably.
Conversely, the impact of liability guarantee by the US government was signi…cantly larger than the respective impact of European policies. While the European policies were not e¤ective enough to surmount negative news the US policy announcements were accompanied by a 73 basis points abnormal return on average which was the largest favorable e¤ect among all twelve policy classes.
The average abnormal return following the US announcements of recapitalization was positive and signi…cantly larger than the reaction following the European announcements. Such announcements by European authorities were associated with an 80 basis points negative abnormal return, which could be due to the disturbing news on the huge loss faced by RBS.
8 There are only two policy announcements recorded as quantitative and credit easing in the database. On one of the announcement days,"RBS said it expects to report a 2008 loss of GBP 22 billion to GBP 28 billion (Wall Street Journal, 20 January 2009)" and hence the entire banking industry was largely shocked. It seems that the news of setting up an asset purchase programme by the BoE was not strong enough to overcome the discouraging news from RBS.
9 Although it is not statistically signi…cant, considering that the announcement e¤ect is distorted by the disturbing news of a huge loss by RBS, its favorable impact could be not negligible. News about bailouts and assistant mergers were not accompanied by signi…cant abnormal returns. By contrast, the average abnormal returns following the US news about bank failures was signi…cantly positive, which is hard to interpret. 10 Volatility E¤ects In the fourth and …fth column of Table 3 we report the cross-sectional average of the event induced volatility estimates for the European and the US policy announcements from the maximum likelihood estimation of model (1). In the sixth column we present their di¤erence. Table 4 .
European policy vs US policy: Post-Lehman period
[Insert Table 4] 1 0 European stocks have surged on the following day of the announcement of the failure of IndyMac. According to Dow Jones, it was because of the"news from the U.S. that the Federal Reserve and Treasury will o¤er a lifeline of fresh credit to mortgage …nanciers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ... Banks were also boosted after Banco Santander con…rmed an all-share deal of GBP1.3 billion for Alliance & Leicester (Dow Jones 2008.07.14)." Moreover, both the European and the US markets reacted positively after the announcement of the failure of the NetBank. This could be because of the optimisitic statement made by the FDIC that "In good times as well as in bad, banks have failed ... It wouldn't be realistic to say that there will be absolutely no more failures, but the vast majority of banks will be able to withstand any problems because of their near historically high capitalization (The Wall Street Journal 2007.09.30)."
On the whole, the US policy announcements seem to have more positive e¤ects than the European policies which con…rms the results presented above. In …ve cases A r are negative and statistically signi…cant at the 5% level (four of them are signi…cant at the 1% level) while in two cases the A r are positive and signi…cant.
In contrast to the result based on the entire crisis period, A r for bailouts and assisted mergers turned positive and highly signi…cant. The di¤erent reactions of the market could be because many of the actions categorized as bailouts and assisted mergers taken by the European authorities during the post-Lehman period were bailouts (e.g. 
European banks vs US banks
We next explore the possibly di¤erent reactions of the European banking stocks and the US banking stocks to same type of policy announcements during the post-Lehman period. For each subsample we test the statistical signi…cance of the abnormal returns with the same approach applied in the previous section. Here we focus on the abnormal returns corresponding to the announcements of monetary policies, liquidity supports and …nancial sector policies which are mostly system-wide measures and are accompanied by signi…cant impacts as seen in the previous section.
[Insert Table 5] Panel A in Table 5 the world but that the opposite is not true (Andersen et al. 2003 , Becker et al. 1995 , Ehramann and Fratzscher 2003 , Wongswan, 2006 ).
Finally we take in account the role of expectations or market anticipation to the announcements which can potentially be important. We address this potential problem by examining the di¤erential reactions of European and US banking stocks to the same policy announcements. It is assumed that di¤erential reactions to the same announcement would neutralize any market anticipations if these anticipations are wide-spread.
[Insert Table 6] The di¤erences in reactions are reported in three cases exhibit a positive sign while four cases exhibit a negative sign (one is signi…cant at the 10% level). Overall, the results may imply that the US policy announcements might have stronger e¤ect on either market on average, while the European policy announcements tend to have stronger e¤ects only on the European stock returns which is consistent with the …ndings in the previous section.
Conclusion
The main goal of this paper is to study how the stock markets banking stocks in particular perceived the policy actions from the two sides of the Atlantic around the subprime crisis. To that end we use the policy news database constructed by Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) to investigate the abnormal returns and the induced volatilities corresponding to key policy announcements by US and European authorities. The sample banks consist of systemically important institutions across Europe and US. The dynamics of the sample stock prices during the crisis period indicate strong heteroskedastic volatility and cross-sectionally diverged volatility, which would impair the power of the traditional event study to test the existence of abnormal returns. We use an EGARCHmodel with event induced volatility which allows the test statistic to be correctly adjusted for these problems.
Our …nding suggest that overall US policy announcements had a stronger impact on the European and US banking industry than European policy announcements. In particular, the announcements of monetary policies and …nancial sector policies by the US authorities were accompanied by higher abnormal returns compared to related announcements of European authorities while the announcements of the US liability guarantees had the most favorable impact on the banking stock returns during the crisis. The lead role of US policies compared to European policies was strength-1 2 B r with a positive sign in the …rst column indicates that the European policy announcements had a stronger e¤ect on the European stock returns; a negative sign indicates the opposite, their impact was stronger on the US stock returns. On the other hand, B r with a positive sign in the second column indicates that the US policy announcements had a stronger e¤ect on the European stock returns; a negatives sign indicates the opposite. ened after the collapse of Lehman brothers. Finally, we also …nd that the policy announcements, regardless of which side of the Atlantic the news arrived from, has increased the return volatility during the crisis. Our results lend additional support to the literature documenting event-induced volatility increases (Savickas 2003, Harrington and Shrider 2007) .
Our …ndings do not provide strong direct indications of the level of the policy impacts and indeed there are several caveats that deserve mention. First, we observe some negative abnormal returns which are counter intuitive considering that policy actions are attempts to provide a positive impact. For instance, it is hard to reason that monetary policies such as interest rate cuts have a negative e¤ect on the state of banking industry. Hence, it is likely that the observed negative abnormal return is a consequence of distortional e¤ects delivered by other factors (e.g., negative news arrival) rather than the announced policy itself.
Second, expectations or market anticipation to the announcements can potentially be very important. We address this problem by examining the di¤erential reactions of European and US banking stocks, B r ; assuming that di¤erential reactions would neutralize any market anticipations if these anticipations are wide-spread.
Third, our analysis su¤ers from cross-sectional event date clustering. As the literature has pointed out (e.g., Kolari and Pynnönen 2010), since the event day is the same for sample stocks cross-sectional correlation among abnormal returns may create statistical issues. Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) proposed a cross-correlation and volatility-adjusted version of Boehmer, Musmeci and Poulsen (1991) test statistic. While their statistic is robust to induced volatility and crosscorrelation it does not adjust for the serial heteroskedasticity which we can accommodate by utilizing an EGARCH model.
Lastly, this study does not provide an analysis on he long-term e¤ectiveness of policies. Instead, it is an investigation of immediate market responses to policy announcements. Some policies may have been di¢ cult to assess by the market in the short-term. For instance, announcements on unconventional measures such as the US asset purchasing program were accompanied by negative immediate responses by the banking stocks which could re ‡ect the uncertainty of how the bill would be used. But of course it does not necessarily mean that the program had a long-term negative e¤ect. Literature studying the long-term e¤ect of policies extends the event window to analyze cumulative abnormal returns (e.g. King (2009) uses 100 days event window). However, this approach would bring another problem of "event window contamination,"i.e., multiple events during the same event window.
Nevertheless these limitations are common in the literature studying market reactions to policy announcements with an event study approach. In particular, the overlapping event problem is unavoidable when using data in daily frequency. 13 A more di¢ cult and interesting question we have not addressed in this study is whether the banking stocks reacted to the content of the policy announcements and/or to the (mainly negative) economic outlook provided together with the announcements during the subprime crisis. We leave this interesting topic for future research. 14 Annex (3) to construct the signi…cant test the numbers reported in the table are based on the cross sectional mean of policy e¤ect estimates. In the 1st and the 2nd column we calculate the average of the estimated abnormal returns observed on the European and US policy announcement days respectively. In the 3rd column we subtract the two …gures (European policy -US policy).
A r then represents the di¤erent reactions between the European and the US policy announcements. In the 4th and 5th column of the table we report the cross-sectional average of the event induced volatility estimates. In the 6th column we present the di¤erence.
A v therefore, represents the di¤erence in the e¤ect on volatility between the European and the US policy announcements. The estimates are statistically signi…cant at 10%; 5%; and 1%; respectively. (3) to construct the signi…cant test the numbers reported in the table are based on the cross sectional mean of policy e¤ect estimates. In the 1st and the 2nd column we calculate the average of the estimated abnormal returns observed on the European and US policy announcement days respectively. In the 3rd column we subtract the two …gures (European policy -US policy).
A v therefore, represents the di¤erence in the e¤ect on volatility between the European and the US policy announcements. The estimates are statistically signi…cant at 10%; 5%; and 1%; respectively. (3) to construct the signi…cant test the numbers reported in the table are based on the cross sectional mean of policy e¤ect estimates.
In the 1st and the 2nd column in Panel A we calculate the average of the estimated abnormal returns of European banking stocks observed on the European and US policy announcement days respectively. In the 3rd column we subtract the two …gures (European policy -US policy).
A r then represents the di¤erent reactions between the European and the US policy announcements. Panel B repeats the same for the the US banks. The estimates are statistically signi…cant at 10%; 5%; and 1%; respectively. 
